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PROMESA AND THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE:
A REMINDER ABOUT UNIFORMITY
Stephen J. Lubben *
ABSTRACT
The Bankruptcy Clause—Article I, Section 8, Clause 4—provides that
“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States . . . .” 1 But Congress
has just enacted a bankruptcy law that applies to a single American territory.
In early May 2017, Puerto Rico and one affiliated entity filed a petition under
this new law. In late May, the Employees Retirement System commenced a
case, along with the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority.
Other Puerto Rican sub-entities are expected to follow. I use this short paper
to examine the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability
Act (PROMESA), which contains the new bankruptcy law made for Puerto
Rico alone, and its place in the Court’s rather confused Bankruptcy Clause
jurisprudence. In sum, I argue that Title III of PROMESA violates the
uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause because it applies too
narrowly. I also submit that its statutory “savings clause” is a cure worse
than the disease it purports to address.
INTRODUCTION
Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution (the
“Bankruptcy Clause”) provides that “The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States . . . .” 2 Thus, bankruptcy, along with nationalization of all
things, is subject to a special requirement of “uniformity,” depriving
Congress of the ability to pass non-uniform laws on these subjects. 3
What it means for a bankruptcy law to be uniform is massively unclear,
despite more than two centuries of jurisprudence on the Bankruptcy Clause.
At one point, it seemed that uniformity meant geographic uniformity: there
could be only one, basic national bankruptcy law, but it could operate in
different ways across the land. Then the Court upheld a bankruptcy law that
applied only to railroads in the Northeast. 4 The one clear proclamation on the

* Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance & Business Ethics, Seton
Hall University School of Law. I received helpful comments on earlier drafts from Peter
Clapp, Edward Hartnett, Melissa Jacoby, Richard Levin, Troy McKenzie, Jim Millstein, and
Sean O’Neal.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
2. See generally Stephen J. Lubben, A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause, 64 CASE

W. RES. L. REV. 319, 319 (2013) [hereinafter Lubben, Bankruptcy Clause] (emphasis added).
3. Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in the
Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591, 633 (1994).
4. Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 156 (1974).
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uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause is that a bankruptcy law
that applied to a single company—a single railroad—was impermissible. 5
And now, Congress has enacted a bankruptcy law that applies to a single
American territory. 6 In early May 2017, Puerto Rico and one affiliated entity
filed a petition under this new law, 7 and in late May, the Employees
Retirement System commenced a case, 8 along with the Puerto Rico Highway
and Transportation Authority. 9 On July 2, 2017, Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority (PREPA) began proceedings. 10 Other Puerto Rican sub-entities
may follow.
This Article examines this new law, the Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), which contains the
new bankruptcy law made for Puerto Rico alone, and discusses its place in
the Court’s rather confused Bankruptcy Clause jurisprudence. This Article
argues that Title III of PROMESA violates the Constitution, specifically the
Bankruptcy Clause because it applies too narrowly. 11 It also submits that its
statutory “savings clause” is a cure worse than the disease it purports to
address. 12
I conclude with observations about who might have an incentive to make
these constitutional arguments. If the new Oversight Board works with the
people of Puerto Rico, the potential problems I identify might never be tested
in court. But this constitutional argument looms as a potential check on the
Oversight Board’s power. And indeed, because the pending cases are apt to
be quite contentious, there are strong incentives for a disgruntled party to
raise the constitutional question, if only to extract better treatment in the case.
5. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 470–73 (1982) (“To survive scrutiny under
the Bankruptcy Clause, a law must at least apply uniformly to a defined class of debtors.”). But see
Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 475 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Our cases do not support the Court’s
view that any bankruptcy law applying to a single named debtor is unconstitutional.”). Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred rather than dissented because “[a]lthough the
question is close, I conclude that Congress did not justify the specificity of RITA in terms of national
policy. Rather, the legislative history indicates an attempt simply to protect employees of a single
railroad from the consequences of bankruptcy.” Id. at 476.
6. 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2232 (2016).
7. The Commonwealth’s case is 3:17-cv-01578, and the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing
Corporation (COFINA) case is 3:17-cv-01599. The cases were subsequently transferred to the
bankruptcy court docket, 3:17-bk-03283 (Bankr. D.P.R. May 3, 2017). Both were filed in the
District of Puerto Rico (San Juan), but are presided over by a district court judge from the Southern
District of New York.
8. See Complaint, In re Emp. Ret. Sys. of the Gov’t of the Commonwealth of P.R. (D.P.R.
2017), available at http://www.promesacodex.com/uploads/9/0/9/7/90977614/ers_petition_[dkt.__
1].pdf.
9. See Complaint, In re P.R. Highways and Transp. Auth. (HTA) (D.P.R. 2017), available at
http://www.promesacodex.com/uploads/9/0/9/7/90977614/hta_petition_[dkt.__1].pdf.
10. See Complaint, In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 872 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. July 3,
2017) (No. 17-1831), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18387.
11. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards A Constitutional Theory of
Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 685 (2008).
12. See 48 U.S.C. § 2102 (2016).
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On the other hand, as I note that the recent developments in the U.S. Virgin
Islands might lead Congress to expand PROMESA to include that territory
as well. Doing so would (however inadvertently) potentially defuse the
uniformity issue.
I.

THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE AND “UNIFORMITY”

As explained by historian Lawrence Friedman, “[t]he colonies had
constantly tinkered with this or that law for the relief of debtors, and the
Revolution did not interrupt the process; indeed, the dislocations of the war,
and the economic misery that followed, gave a strong push to debtor relief.” 13
With the adoption of the Constitution in 1788, the Bankruptcy Clause
gave the federal government the power to enact “uniform Laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” 14 In the Federalist, James
Madison argued that the federal bankruptcy power was intimately connected
with the interstate commerce power. 15 Alexander Hamilton would later echo
this argument with even greater force when he pointed to the federal
government’s power to override state bankruptcy laws as indicative of a
larger federal supremacy in economic matters that thus supported the creation
of a national bank. 16
Several early cases suggested that the uniformity requirement of the
Bankruptcy Clause required complete federal preemption of state insolvency
laws. For example, in 1814, Justice Washington (in a circuit opinion) ruled
that a Pennsylvania insolvency statute was unconstitutional, 17 reasoning that
“a uniform bankruptcy system logically demanded a single regulation
applicable throughout the Union.” 18 Justice Washington’s ruling was soon
rejected by the full Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Marshall, in Sturges
v. Crowninshield. 19 The notion of what we might today call a “dormant
Bankruptcy Clause” was put to rest. 20 While the precise scope of the
Bankruptcy Clause, and its true meaning, remained uncertain for the
remainder of the Nineteenth Century, the question of uniformity did not
squarely arise again until Congress passed a new bankruptcy law in the late
1890s. 21
13. LAWRENCE H. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 201 (rev. 3d ed. 2005).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
15. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10

(James Madison) (discussing the inherent tension between debtors and creditors).
16. See Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, in
8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965).
17. See Golden v. Prince, 10 F. Cas. 542, 544–45 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 5,509).
18. Herbert A. Johnson, Bushrod Washington, 62 VAND. L. REV. 447, 465 (2009).
19. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819).
20. See KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 170 (2008).
21. The Court but briefly touched on the issue in connection with the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.
See Nelson v. Carland, 42 U.S. 265 (1843). Uniformity was also addressed by the lower courts in
connection with the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.
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The 1898 Bankruptcy Act raised uniformity issues in at least two ways,
but only one made it to the Supreme Court. First, William Howard Taft,
future Chief Justice and President, rejected a challenge to the Act’s
constitutionality on uniformity grounds. The debtor argued that the new law
improperly distinguished between natural and artificial persons, and thus was
not uniform, as required by the Bankruptcy Clause. 22 This involved
uniformity in the treatment of debtors, an issue where the modern Court has
suggested that uniformity does not apply. For example, in the Rock Island
Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act case, discussed more indepth below, the Court explained that the “uniformity requirement of the
Bankruptcy Clause is not an Equal Protection Clause for bankrupts.” 23
The second uniformity issue that accompanied the 1898 Act was the use
of state exemption laws in personal bankruptcy cases. As the exemption laws
differed—and still do differ—across states, a creditor in one state might
recover more than a creditor in another, even holding all other factors equal. 24
This presented a clear question of whether it was required that the law operate
uniformly across the nation. That is, should federal debtor-creditor rights be
broadly indistinguishable, regardless of the district where a case might be
pending?
In a 1902 decision, Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, the Court
announced that the lone constitutional requirement is “geographical”
uniformity, rather than personal uniformity. 25 The Court did so, however,
with no analysis whatsoever. 26 The case remains a key decision on the
“uniformity” requirement in the Clause. 27 In 1918, the Court reaffirmed the
Moyses holding, explaining that:
Notwithstanding this requirement as to uniformity the bankruptcy acts of
Congress may recognize the laws of the state in certain particulars, although
such recognition may lead to different results in different states. For
example, the Bankruptcy Act recognizes and enforces the laws of the states
affecting dower, exemptions, the validity of mortgages, priorities of
payment and the like. Such recognition in the application of state laws does
not affect the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act, although in these
particulars the operation of the Act is not alike in all the states. 28

For several decades, the Court did not address uniformity in any form,
until the passage of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (Regional
22. See Leidigh Carriage Co. v. Stengel, 95 F. 637, 646–47 (6th Cir. 1899).
23. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 470 n.11 (1982).
24. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.

BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 46 (1995).
25. See Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902).
26. See Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination
of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 61–62 (1983).
27. For an application in the municipal bankruptcy context, see In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R.
97, 136–37 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
28. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918).
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Rail Reorganization Act), 29 and its creation of a special court focused on a
specific set of debtors that led to another uniformity challenge. In short, the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act created a special bankruptcy process for
Northeastern railroads. 30 Several courts that were handling the individual
bankruptcy proceedings of the railroads held the Act unconstitutional, 31 but
the special railroad court itself, a three-judge panel headed by Judge Henry
J. Friendly, upheld the Act. 32
In affirming the special railroad court’s decision, the Supreme Court
addressed the contention that the Act violated the Bankruptcy Clause because
the process was not sufficiently “uniform” as it applied to but a part of the
United States. 33 The Court acknowledged the “surface appeal” of the
argument, especially in light of the Moyses opinion, but rejected the argument
as “it overlooks the flexibility inherent in the constitutional provision.” 34 The
Court went on to explain that:
The uniformity provision does not deny Congress power to take into
account differences that exist between different parts of the country, and to
fashion legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems. “The
problem dealt with [under the Bankruptcy Clause] may present significant
variations in different parts of the country.” We therefore agree with the
Special Court that the uniformity clause was not intended “to hobble
Congress by forcing it into nationwide enactments to deal with conditions
calling for remedy only in certain regions.” 35

While Justice Douglas (partially joined by Justice Stewart) 36 complained
that the majority had ignored “the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy
Clause of the Constitution,” 37 the Court was unmoved.
The Court’s analysis is particularly confusing, in that it also seemed to
assert “no harm, no foul.” Specifically, since there were no railroad
bankruptcies pending outside the Northeast at the time Congress acted, the
Court seemed to suggest that the same result might have been obtained under
a nationwide railroad bankruptcy act in any event. 38 What role this alternative
29. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 986 (1974).
30. See Lubben, Bankruptcy Clause, supra note 2, at 405.
31. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 382 F. Supp. 856, 870 (E.D. Pa. 1974); In re Lehigh Valley

R.R., 382 F. Supp. 854, 855 (E.D. Pa. 1974); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co. (Secondary Debtors),
382 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Pa. 1974); In re Cent. R.R., No. B.401-67 (D.N.J. June 28, 1974); In re
Lehigh & Hudson River Ry. Co., 377 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
32. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 910 (Reg’l Rail Reorg. Ct. 1974).
33. See Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 158 (1974).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 159 (citations omitted).
36. Justice Stewart dissented “substantially for the reasons set out in Part II of the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice DOUGLAS.” Id. at 161.
37. Id. at 185 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38. See id. at 159–60 (“Thus the Rail Act in fact operates uniformly upon all bankrupt railroads
then operating in the United States and uniformly with respect to all creditors of each of these
railroads.”).
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explanation played in the Court’s holding was unclear. But in a later case, the
Court emphasized this basis for the Court’s holding over the apparent main
holding of the case. 39
The Court’s holding can perhaps be best summarized as having provided
Congress with the ability to enact laws dealing with geographically isolated
problems, as long as the law operates uniformly upon a given class of
creditors and debtors. That obviously leaves the question of how much
flexibility Congress has to draw such classes.
About a decade later, the Supreme Court struck down a federal law for
the first and only time on uniformity grounds. 40 In particular, it held that the
Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act (RITA), 41
which essentially created a retroactive priority for employees of a railroad in
a pending section 77 bankruptcy proceeding, was problematic because of its
narrow scope. 42 The Court seemed to be especially troubled that RITA looked
like a private bankruptcy bill, the kind of thing that may have motivated the
passage of the Bankruptcy Clause in the first instance. 43 The Court made little
effort to reconcile this conception of uniformity with its previous,
geographic-focused explications of the Bankruptcy Clause. 44
While private insolvency bills were likely one issue motivating the
Bankruptcy Clause, an equally important issue was the wide variety of
bankruptcy or insolvency statutes in play throughout the colonies and the
states immediately before and after the American Revolution. 45 These
statutes took a variety of approaches to both business and personal
bankruptcy, generally far in advance of anything seen under either English
bankruptcy statues or early federal efforts, like the 1800 Bankruptcy Act. 46
Private bills alone cannot explain the inclusion of the Clause in the
Constitution.
If we return to Federalist 42, we recall that James Madison linked the
Bankruptcy Clause to the Commerce Clause, and other elements of national
commerce. 47 While this broad, national view of the economy is more often
39. See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 84 (1983).
40. See Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469–71 (1982); see also In re

McFarland, 790 F.3d 1182, 1194 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Gibbons, after all, was the first (ever!) opinion
enforcing bankruptcy uniformity against Congress . . . .”) (enthusiastic punctuation in original).
State laws were not unfrequently struck down, but on preemption rather than uniformity grounds.
E.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 266 (1929).
41. See Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 96-254, 94
Stat. 399 (1980) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1018 (2012)).
42. See Joseph E. Conley, Jr., Bankruptcy, 43 LA. L. REV. 327, 337 (1982); see also Reviving
the Uniformity Requirement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 71, 73 (1982).
43. See Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 455 U.S. at 471.
44. See Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different, 77 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 129, 162 (2003).
45. See Lubben, Bankruptcy Clause, supra note 2, at 340–45.
46. See Hollis R. Bailey, A Discharge in Insolvency, and Its Effect on Non-Residents, 6 HARV.
L. REV. 349, 351 (1893).
47. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 15.
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linked to Alexander Hamilton in modern times, it provides us with key
insight to the Founders’ intentions. Moreover, in this instance, the Founders’
intentions and a more modern, pragmatic approach to the Constitution agree.
In either event, it makes sense to ensure that some core aspects of debtorcreditor law do not vary by state, but rather operate as a single, national
whole. 48
Thus, attempting to make some sense of the Supreme Court’s muddle in
this area, I submit that the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity requirement is
best seen as a requirement for bankruptcy laws of broad, national
applicability. Despite the Court’s timidity in this area, this Article argues that
Moyses was wrongly decided, and that exemptions in bankruptcy court
should be federal, in accordance with the uniformity requirement. 49
It might allow for regional bankruptcy laws if justified by a perceived
regional problem that Congress branded clearly. 50 But this argument
suggests—consistent with Justice Rehnquist’s holding in Gibbons—that
narrowly drawn bankruptcy laws are inherently suspect and not apt to be
within Congress’ powers under the Clause.
I proceed on this basis in Part III, but first pause to address PROMESA
and the bankruptcy law contained within its Title III.
II. A PRIMER ON PROMESA AND BANKRUPTCY FOR A
TERRITORY
PROMESA’s enactment had two immediate effects for Puerto Rico.
First, the statute initiated a temporary stay on creditor action against the
territory. 51 Given that the Supreme Court had struck down the territory’s
Recovery Act 52 and it was unable to pay or refinance its debt as it came due,
this provision provided obvious benefits. Second, the territory’s ability to
manage its own financial affairs was taken away by the creation of an
oversight panel. 53 The panel—or more formally, the Financial Oversight and
48. As derived from the foregoing statement, I see the limits of “bankruptcy” lying somewhere
beyond simple insolvency. Contra Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63
TENN. L. REV. 487, 556 (1996).
49. Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional Limitations on State-Enacted Bankruptcy Exemption
Legislation and the Long Overdue Case for Uniformity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 353, 410 (2014)
(advocating that exemptions in bankruptcy court should be federal). But see Tristan G. Axelrod,
Defending State Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 27 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 284, 333 (2015) (arguing
that state exemptions should be permitted in bankruptcy court).
50. In this sense, I would adopt Justice Marshall’s concurrence in Gibbons, but apply it
(retroactively) to the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n. v. Gibbons,
455 U.S. 457, 476 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring).
51. See 48 U.S.C. § 2194 (2016).
52. See Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1939 (2016).
Background on the Recovery Act (including my argument that it should not have been preempted
by section 903 of the Bankruptcy Code), can be found in Stephen J. Lubben, Puerto Rico and the
Bankruptcy Clause, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 553, 554 (2014).
53. See 48 U.S.C. § 2121.
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Management Board for Puerto Rico (the Oversight Board)—became
empowered to override the decisions of Puerto Rico’s elected governor and
legislature, particularly in money matters. PROMESA’s Title III also creates
a bankruptcy system for Puerto Rico, albeit one that is codified in Title 48. 54
Like chapter 9, the municipal bankruptcy provision of the Bankruptcy
Code, Title III gets much of its heft from incorporating other provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code. 55 And courts are instructed that the “term used in a
section of Title 11, made applicable in a case under this subchapter by
subsection (a), has the meaning given to the term for the purpose of the
applicable section, unless the term is otherwise defined in this subchapter.” 56
Unlike chapter 9, however, references to the “trustee” in the Bankruptcy
Code are defined in Title III to refer to the Oversight Board, whereas in
chapter 9 they are deemed to refer to the debtor itself. 57 This is a subtle,
bankruptcy-specific indication of the degree of power that Title III grants the
Oversight Board with respect to Puerto Rico. The law also gives the
Oversight Board the power to consent to court orders that “interfere” with
Puerto Rico’s political authority. 58
Debtors can comprise either the territory itself or a “covered territorial
instrumentality.” 59 In addition, another provision of Title III provides that an
entity can be a debtor only if an oversight panel has been established for the
territory and its instrumentalities. 60 Under PROMESA’s Title I, an oversight
panel is only established for Puerto Rico, 61 therefore these provisions
effectively provide that only Puerto Rico and its municipal subsidiaries are
eligible to enter a case under Title III.
As in chapter 9, there is no estate, allowing the debtor to retain ownership
and control over all property. 62 Of course, in Title III cases, that power will

54. The author was unable to find any other instance of Congress telling the Law Revision
Counsel where to codify a new statue. See Id. § 2105. The powers set forth in Title III are related to
those in Title VI, which binds holdouts to certain negotiated debt workouts, but this paper focuses
solely on Title III. In some respects Title VI may be more politically palatable than Title III, since
the former only relates to bond debt, but it is unclear that such considerations will influence the
Oversight Panel. Throughout, I refer to the various titles of the Act; as codified, these became
“subchapters” of PROMESA.
55. See 48 U.S.C. § 2161(a). One practical difference between Title III and chapter 9 is that
under the former, the court is given express authority to oversee professional fees. Id. § 2176.
56. Id. § 2161(b).
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 902(5).
58. See 48 U.S.C. § 2165. Under chapter 9, it is the municipality itself that has this power. See
C. Scott Pryor, Who Pays the Price? The Necessity of Taxpayer Participation in Chapter 9, 24
WIDENER L.J. 81, 83 (2015).
59. 48 U.S.C. § 2161(c)(2).
60. See id. § 2162.
61. Id. § 2121.
62. See In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 434 B.R. 131, 142 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); see
also 48 U.S.C. § 2161(c)(5) (“The term ‘property of the estate’, when used in a section of title 11
made applicable in a case under this subchapter by subsection (a), means property of the debtor.”).
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necessarily be shared—to put it mildly—with the Oversight Board. 63
Voluntary petitions under Title III can be filed only by the Oversight Board, 64
and only after the Board determines that the debtor:
1. “[H]as made good-faith efforts to reach a consensual restructuring with
creditors;”
2. Has adopted procedures to produce audited financial statements, and
has made those statements publicly available;
3.

Has come up with a viable fiscal plan; and

4. Is not the subject of a viable restructuring under Title VI of
PROMESA. 65

The first point is similar to the requirements under section 109(c)(5) of
the Bankruptcy Code, while the others are unique and somewhat specific to
Puerto Rico. 66
Title III permits the filing of “joint petitions,” but then further provides
that “nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing substantive
consolidation of the cases of affiliated debtors.” 67 What a joint petition would
achieve with these restrictions is a bit unclear—although perhaps a court
could still order substantive consolidation in any event, using its inherent
equitable powers. 68
In a Title III case involving Puerto Rico, the judge—a district court judge,
rather than a bankruptcy judge as required by chapter 9—will be selected by
the Chief Justice. 69 Somewhat oddly, PROMESA provides for a possible
filing outside of Puerto Rico. Indeed, filing can be effectuated outside the
First Circuit, which has jurisdiction over Puerto Rico and normally hears
63. In some sense the Oversight Board has the power that one of its appointed members recently
argued should be given to the court in municipal bankruptcy cases. See Clayton P. Gillette & David
A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J.
1150 (2016).
64. See David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Be an Option (for People, Places, or
Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 2229 (2014). In chapter 9 the debtor files its own petition,
provided the state government has previously indicated that municipalities within its jurisdiction
can file for federal bankruptcy protection. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Detroit Bankruptcy, PreEligibility, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 852 (2014); see also Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and
Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 457–71 (2014).
65. See 48 U.S.C. §§ 2146, 2164.
66. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1152, 1169
(2014).
67. 48 U.S.C. § 2164(f).
68. Interestingly, PROMESA incorporates section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which
bankruptcy courts often point to when authorizing substantive consolidation. See 48 U.S.C. §
2161(a). See In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750, 763–64 (9th Cir. 2000). Although determining what a
court’s authority is with regard to a governmental entity, especially one with as confused a
constitutional conception as Puerto Rico, might be challenging.
69. See 48 U.S.C. § 2168. For the rules on judicial selection in traditional chapter 9 cases, see
Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG.
55, 72–73 (2016).
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appeals from the district court in Puerto Rico. 70 To date, all Title III filings
have been made in the District of Puerto Rico, and are presided over by Judge
Laura Taylor Swain of the Southern District of New York. 71
Additionally, only the Oversight Board can file a “plan of adjustment”
under Title III. 72 The court is instructed to confirm the plan if it complies
with both the traditional chapter 9 confirmation requirements, 73 and certain
additional requirements imposed by Title III, 74 including a requirement that
the plan conform with the Oversight Board’s current fiscal plan for the debtor
in question. Since the Oversight Board has the sole power to propose a plan
of adjustment, such a requirement seems more than a bit superfluous, but
perhaps it guards against inconsistencies within the Board. 75
The confirmation requirements also include some “helpful” interpretive
advice for the court. In chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy cases, the court must
find that “the plan is in the best interests of creditors and is feasible.” 76 Both
are terms that have well-established meaning in chapter 11, although
especially with regard to the former, that meaning does not easily translate to
chapter 9. 77
In a chapter 11, or corporate bankruptcy case, the “best interests of the
creditors” test requires that the plan provide at least as much as a hypothetical
chapter 7 liquidation, thus providing a floor, or minimum, on creditor
recoveries in a reorganization. 78 In chapter 9, where there can be no
liquidation, this test does not make much sense. Accordingly, courts have
adapted the tests to fit the municipal context, with the “best interests” test
requiring the debtor to do the best it can for creditors, and the feasibility test
requiring the court to guard against overpromising by the same debtor. 79
Title III restates these requirements, and then attempts to define them,
providing that the court shall confirm the plan if “the plan is feasible and in
the best interests of creditors, which shall require the court to consider
whether available remedies under the non-bankruptcy laws and constitution

70. See 48 U.S.C. § 2167.
71. See Matthew Goldstein, Judge in Puerto Rico’s Debt Lawsuit Handled Major Financial

Cases, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/business/dealbook/judgepuerto-rico-case.html?mcubz=3.
72. See 48 U.S.C. § 2172.
73. See generally BLOOMBERG LAW: BANKRUPTCY TREATISE, PART IV: ADJUSTMENTS OF
MUNICIPALITY DEBTS, CHAPTER 149: BANKRUPTCY CODE § 943 – CONFIRMATION, Bloomberg
Law (database updated 2017).
74. See 48 U.S.C. § 2174.
75. See Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. § 2172(a)
(2016).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012).
77. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), (11), neither of which is incorporated into chapter 9 by 11
U.S.C. § 901. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Chapter 9 Plan Confirmation Standards and the Role of
State Choices, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 71, 79 (2015).
78. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
79. See In re Pierce Cty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 718 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009).

2017]

PROMESA and the Bankruptcy Clause

63

of the territory would result in a greater recovery for the creditors than is
provided by such plan.” 80
The definition seems to pertain more to the “best interests” part of this
provision. And while the provision is undoubtedly aimed at drawing the
court’s attention to Puerto Rico’s territorial constitution, which provides a
kind of priority for general obligation bondholders, doing so will only invite
dispute as to what those constitutional provisions mean. 81
Further complicating that discussion are the provisions of PROMESA
itself, such as the provision which states that:
This Act may not be construed to permit the discharge of obligations arising
under Federal police or regulatory laws, including laws relating to the
environment, public health or safety, or territorial laws implementing such
Federal legal provisions. This includes compliance obligations,
requirements under consent decrees or judicial orders, and obligations to
pay associated administrative, civil, or other penalties. 82

What precisely are Puerto Rico’s obligations under “[f]ederal police or
regulatory laws”? 83
And, of course, there is the question of what it means for the court to
“consider whether available remedies under the non-bankruptcy laws and
constitution of the territory would result in a greater recovery for the creditors
than is provided by such plan.” 84 How much cogitation is required?
Further, confirmation of a plan under Title III provides the same effect
as confirmation under chapter 9. 85 That is, the plan under the Act becomes
binding and discharges the debtors. 86 Throughout the Title III process, the
Oversight Board is in full control, thus potentially governing the degree to
which all these questions are litigated. 87

80.
81.
82.
83.

48 U.S.C. § 2174(b)(6).
See P.R. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 8.
48 U.S.C. § 2164(h).
On the one hand, this may require no more than what is generally required of corporate
debtors under the “common law” of bankruptcy. E.g., Midlantic Nat’l. Bank v. N.J. Dep’t. of Envtl.
Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986). On the other hand, there are ways for corporate debtors to evade such
prescriptions, as chapter 11 debtors are not subject to anything like the quoted statutory text. See
Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J. Lubben, Involuntary Creditors and Corporate Bankruptcy, 45
U.B.C. L. REV. 253, 272–73 (2012) (discussing the use of bankruptcy sales to “cleanse” assets of
environmental liabilities).
84. 48 U.S.C. § 2174(b)(6) (emphasis added).
85. 48 U.S.C. § 2161(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 944 (2012)). See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Who
Does Bankruptcy? Mapping Pension Impairment in Chapter 9, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 585,
594 (2014).
86. See Deocampo v. Potts, 836 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 2016).
87. See 48 U.S.C. § 2175.
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III. PROMESA AND CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY
In the early versions of the bill that ultimately became PROMESA, Title
III, indeed most of the law, would have applied to all American territories. 88
Territories other than Puerto Rico, however, would have had a say in the
law’s application to them: namely, the law would have been extended upon
request by the territorial governor. Puerto Rico was not to be given such a
choice. 89
As ultimately enacted, however, PROMESA only applies to Puerto Rico.
This presents obvious uniformity issues under the Bankruptcy Clause. The
Court’s jurisprudence makes clear that Congress can distinguish between
states and territories, 90 but just as Congress could not pass a bankruptcy law
for a single state, it likewise may not create a bankruptcy law for a single
territory. But we might pause for a moment and consider if the Bankruptcy
Clause even applies to Puerto Rico or any other territory. This inquiry begins
with whether the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause applies at
all. If, and only if, it does apply in the first instance would the second question
come to the fore—that is, whether PROMESA’s application solely to Puerto
Rico is permissible.
The basic question of the Bankruptcy Clause’s applicability to the
territories has never been directly addressed, although both bondholders and
Puerto Rico have assumed such applicability during the course of their
already extensive litigation. 91 The First Circuit has routinely assumed the
applicability of the Commerce Clause to Puerto Rico, and in his concurrence
in the Recovery Act cases, Judge Torruella argued that these cases also
implied the applicability of the Bankruptcy Clause to Puerto Rico. 92
In an apparent attempt to address this issue, the law rather plainly states
that “Congress enacts this chapter [i.e., PROMESA] pursuant to Article IV,
Section 3 of the Constitution of the United States, which provides Congress
the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations for
territories.” 93 It is unclear whether this should change the analysis. In the
RITA case, the Court rejected the argument that Congress had the ability to
enact non-uniform bankruptcy laws under the Commerce Clause. 94 Perhaps
88. See H.R. 4900, 114th Cong. (2016) (section 101 in particular).
89. See id. §101(b)(2).
90. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Land That Democratic Theory Forgot, 83 IND. L.J. 1525,

1534 (2008); Chapter One: Territorial Federalism, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1632, 1648 (2017).
91. E.g., Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures Fund Ltd. v. Garcia-Padilla, 201 F. Supp. 3d 223,
225 (D.P.R. 2016).
92. See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322, 346–47 n.41 (1st Cir. 2015)
(Torruella, J. concurring), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
93. 48 U.S.C. § 2121 (2016).
94. See Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 (1982) (arguing that “if we
were to hold that Congress had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress
to enact bankruptcy laws”).
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a robust conception of Congress’ powers over territories—which would
probably necessitate an uncomfortable embrace of the Insular Cases 95—
could help draw a distinction between Congress’ powers under Article I and
Article IV.
In short, under the Insular Cases, Congress has near absolute powers
over “unincorporated” territories, a power that exceeds even that which is
granted by the Commerce Clause in the post-New Deal era. 96 The Territorial
Clause gives Congress authority to “make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” 97
Under this power, “Congress can, pursuant to the plenary powers conferred
by the Territorial Clause, legislate as to Puerto Rico in a manner different
from the rest of the United States.” 98 That is, the Territorial Clause contains
its own sort of “non-uniformity” provision, at least once the Court developed
the concept of unincorporated territories.
Where most congressional powers are concerned, the states are the
general, residual sovereign, and the national government is a limited
sovereign with enumerated powers. In that context, it may be important to
not let one enumerated power overcome the limitations on another
enumerated power, particularly if the more limited power more precisely
covers the area. But where the territory power is involved, the national
government is the general sovereign, armed with the police power. There is
no need to worry about escaping the limitations of one enumerated power by
invoking another less precisely-targeted one: the national government has all
sovereign power with regard to the territories. 99
That, of course, assumes that Puerto Rico did not achieve even limited
sovereignty when Congress approved its move to “commonwealth” status. 100
95. See United States v. Lebron-Caceres, 157 F. Supp. 3d 80, 88 n.10 (D.P.R. 2016) (explaining
that “[t]he name Insular Cases is normally given to a series of nine decisions rendered in 1901,”
and citing same).
96. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008) (explaining that “the Constitution
applies in full in incorporated Territories surely destined for statehood but only in part in
unincorporated Territories”); see also Nathan Muchnick, The Insular Citizens: America’s Lost
Electorate v. Stare Decisis, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 797, 806 (2016).
97. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
98. United States v. Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d 151, 154 (1st Cir.1987).
99. As the Court explained of Congress’s similar power over the District of Columbia:
Congress may . . . exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature
. . . would have in legislating for state or local purposes. Congress ‘may exercise within
the District all legislative powers that the legislature of a state might exercise within the
State, and may vest and distribute the judicial authority in and among courts and
magistrates, and regulate judicial proceedings before them, as it may think fit, so long as
it does not contravene any provision of the constitution of the United States.’
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973) (quoting Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S.
1 (1899)).
100. See Andrés González Berdecía, Puerto Rico Before the Supreme Court of the United States:
Constitutional Colonialism in Action, 7 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 80, 128 (2016).
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But that does not seem like too much of a stretch, given the Court’s recent
Puerto Rico jurisprudence. 101
The argument would then proceed to propose that Congress’ power of
non-uniformity under the Territorial Clause allows it to trump the uniformity
requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. Indeed, in Downes v. Bidwell, 102 one
of the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court held that sections of the Foraker Act
imposing separate duties upon Puerto Rican products did not violate another
Article I, Section eight uniformity provision of the Constitution, which
requires that “all Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States.” 103 The Court stated that Puerto Rico was “a territory
appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United
States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution[.]” 104 The Court further
noted:
It is obvious that, in the annexation of outlying and distant possessions,
grave questions will arise from differences of race, habits, laws, and
customs of the people, and from differences of soil, climate, and production,
which may require action on the part of Congress that would be quite
unnecessary in the annexation of contiguous territory inhabited only by
people of the same race, or by scattered bodies of native Indians. 105

But while the uniformity clause, in clause one of Section eight, has
essentially been rendered something of a dead letter, 106 the uniformity
requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause, as noted, has not. 107
The argument that the Territorial Clause could permit non-uniform
insolvency laws would also not address the Court’s basic concern that
allowing bankruptcy laws to be passed under other Congressional powers
would enable an “end run” on the Bankruptcy Clause. 108 As the Second
Circuit has explained:
The Gibbons Court considered primarily what RITA did, not Congress’s
belief as to which clause authorized its action. RITA mandated that an
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016).
See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
See Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 287.
Id. at 282.
See, e.g., United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983). U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1
provides: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”
107. See Schultz v. United States, 529 F.3d 343, 355 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he text and the
background of the Taxing Power is wholly inapposite to that of the Bankruptcy Clause.”).
108. See Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Congressional Power, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 89 (2016)
(“By setting explicit limits on bankruptcy laws, the Bankruptcy Clause vested Congress with powers
that were independent of the Commerce Clause.”); see also Michael Coenen, Combining
Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1126 (2016); Jordan Christopher Seal,
Constructive Upheaval: Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons and the “Choice of Clause”
Challenge to Traditions of Statutory Construction, 47 GA. L. REV. 961, 972 (2013).
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existing bankruptcy proceeding be handled differently from any other
bankruptcy in the United States. It also altered the statutory priorities for
paying debts and the administrative scheme contemplated by the
Bankruptcy Code. It was a bankruptcy law. 109

Title III is also an example of bankruptcy law. 110 Indeed, it incorporates
myriad provisions of the Bankruptcy Code itself, and it would be hard to
characterize it as anything other than a bankruptcy law for a territory.
But for Gibbons and its decision regarding RITA, upholding Title III
against a uniformity challenge under the Bankruptcy Clause would be
relatively easy—given the Regional Rail Reorganization Act cases or
Moyses, both essentially holding that the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity
provision is more of a description of the types of laws that may be passed,
than a limitation on Congressional power. 111 But assuming the Court is not
ready to either abandon Gibbons, or flatly announce that its holding does not
apply outside the incorporated United States, uniformity must be addressed.
PROMESA’s drafters obviously anticipated that Title III might present a
problem under the Bankruptcy Clause, and thus they included a “savings”
clause. Under this clause:
If a court holds invalid any provision of this chapter [i.e., PROMESA] or
the application thereof on the ground that the provision fails to treat
similarly situated territories uniformly, then the court shall, in granting a
remedy, order that the provision of this chapter or the application thereof be
extended to any other similarly situated territory, provided that the
legislature of that territory adopts a resolution signed by the territory’s
governor requesting the establishment and organization of a Financial
Oversight and Management Board pursuant to section 2121 of this title. 112

In short, let’s go back to the old version of the bill. 113
Of course, that version of the bill is not the one President Obama actually
signed, and the statute asks the judge to “fix” the legislation on behalf of the
other two branches that are more normally associated with legislating. There
would seem to be some obvious separation of powers issues here. And one
could also imagine that the elected representatives of other territories might
be less than thrilled with a federal judge acting under this provision. Not a
particularly useful “savings” clause after all.
109. United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2007).
110. See Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513–14 (1938) (“The subject of

bankruptcies is nothing less than ‘the subject of the relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or
fraudulent debtor, and his creditors, extending to his and their relief.’”).
111. See Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1249–50
(2016).
112. 48 U.S.C. § 2102(b) (2016).
113. The savings clause seems to fall into the trap of conflating the Bankruptcy Clause with the
Equal Protection Clause. See Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n. v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 470 n. 11 (1982)
(noting “[t]he uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause is not an Equal Protection Clause
for bankrupts”).
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Accordingly, it seems the “uniformity” issue will have to be addressed
head-on. The question is essentially whether Title III of PROMESA looks
more like the RITA case, or more like the Regional Rail Reorganization Act
cases? At the territory level, Title III is more like RITA—a law that applies
to a single debtor. 114 Of course, Puerto Rico’s various semi-sovereign entities
can also file under Title III, indeed several have done so, which makes this
more like a regional bankruptcy law, albeit one that covers the region
commonly known as “Puerto Rico.” 115 For these entities, the law looks like
an extension of chapter 9—done in a rather confounding and obfuscating
manner.
But with regard to Puerto Rico itself, the uniformity problem is hard to
ignore. Whether a court might strike down Title III as applied to Puerto Rico,
while leaving the rest in place, is unclear. 116 Arguably the Commonwealth
itself was Congress’ prime reason for enacting PROMESA. The Bankruptcy
Clause clearly allows Congress to address different problems through
different laws: indeed, the actual text refers to uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcy. 117
Thus, if Congress wants to treat railroads, or global systemically
important financial institutions, distinct from all other corporations, it can
undoubtedly do so. 118 But in Title III we have a law that treats a single
territory in a divergent way. Puerto Rico is not a class of one—indeed, the
U.S. Virgin Islands, another unincorporated territory in the same basic part
of the world, has a bigger debt load per capita than Puerto Rico. 119
Perhaps Puerto Rico, along with its various instrumentalities, should be
seen as a geographic area, in which case PROMESA would be equivalent to
the legislation upheld in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act cases. Indeed,
Puerto Rico is both a debtor and something of a geographic region (“Puerto
Rico & Co.”), and Gibbons does not give a firm answer as to how best to sort
between the two.
But if we loosely analogize Puerto Rico to a railroad—as in Gibbons—
or another business entity, its instrumentalities are something like
subsidiaries. In Gibbons, the Court was concerned that RITA focused on a
single company: “The conclusion is . . . inevitable that [the statute] is not a
response either to the particular problems of major railroad bankruptcies or

114. Id. at 470.
115. See Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121

YALE L.J. 888 (2012).
116. See 48 U.S.C. §2102(a) (severability provision).
117. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 230–31 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
118. Cf. Stephen J. Lubben & Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Too Big and Unable to Fail, 69 FLA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2017).
119. See Brian Chappatta, More in Debt Than Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands Rejects Rescue,
BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-31/more-indebt-than-puerto-rico-the-virgin-islands-rejects-rescue.
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to any geographically isolated problem: it is a response to the problems
caused by the bankruptcy of one railroad.” 120
The opinion does not suggest that RITA would have been any more
acceptable if it applied to a corporate group—the “private bill” problem
would remain. That is, pointing to Puerto Rico’s instrumentalities will not
transform it from a single debtor to a geographic group permissible under the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act cases. While Congress might have been
able to create a special law of “American territories east of the mainland,”
pointing to a single territory as a geographic group seems to go too far.
The Seventh Circuit has summarized the Bankruptcy Clause as
prohibiting “only two things. The first is arbitrary regional differences in the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The second is private bankruptcy bills—
that is, bankruptcy laws limited to a single debtor—or the equivalent.” 121
Title III is in some sense both. Congress has arbitrarily distinguished Puerto
Rico from the other territories, and in doing so, has created what amounts to
a private bankruptcy bill for the Commonwealth alone.
One last defense of PROMESA turns on Congress’ ability to enact future
oversight boards, for other territories. The ability is similar, one might posit,
to the fact that unlike Missouri, Illinois does not currently have a law in place
that explicitly allows municipalities to file chapter 9 but could pass one
tomorrow (theoretically, at least). 122 Does this contingent ability undermine
the uniformity issue? I argue that it does not, mostly because Gibbons itself
would have been decided differently if potential future congressional action
mattered. Presumably, Congress could have—at some point in the future—
enacted laws like RITA that applied to other railroads. At some point, upon
enactment of enough such laws, the Court’s uniformity concerns would have
presumably vanished.
But the Gibbons Court showed no inclination of worrying about what
Congress might do in the future, and instead struck down RITA based on how
it then stood. 123 And indeed, this reference to future congressional action
would presumably save every law that was subject to a uniformity challenge:
simply presume Congress might enact a fix, and the problem is gone.
Thus, we get to the practical question of who might raise the uniformity
issue. It is likely that the creditors who fought so hard to “knock out” the
Recovery Act might hesitate to challenge PROMESA, which presumably
120. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n. v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 470 (1982).
121. In re Reese, 91 F.3d 37, 39 (7th Cir. 1996).
122. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012).
An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and only if such entity . . . is
specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a debtor under
such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by
State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter.
Id.

123. See Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 471–73.
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represents a more-acceptable avenue for addressing Puerto Rico’s financial
distress.
On the other hand, it has been widely noted that questions of bondholder
priority loom large in the Commonwealth’s recently commenced Title III
case. 124 Any bondholder that loses those priority disputes will have some
incentive to surface the constitutional question, or at least threaten to do so.
And Puerto Rico, itself, might have an incentive to raise these issues,
particularly if it felt that the Oversight Board was running its Title III case in
a way that it found objectionable. That is, if the Oversight Board put forward
a plan that was politically unpalatable, the Commonwealth might have some
incentive to torpedo the entire process.
And could Congress not fix the problem by reenacting all of PROMESA,
or at least Title III, thus keeping the existing Oversight Board in place?
Perhaps, if we assume that the class of American territories is sufficiently
large enough to fit within a Regional Rail Reorganization Act cases analysis.
But surely, there must have been a reason why Congress did not enact the
original version of the bill, and those reasons might resurface and delay
reenactment. 125
Puerto Rico has some ability to at least “throw a spanner in the works”
of the Title III process if it does not like how it is going. This may be
something for the Oversight Board to keep in mind as it proceeds.
CONCLUSION
Title III of PROMESA enacts what can only be referred to as a
bankruptcy law for Puerto Rico. This law applies to a single territory, and is
thus impermissible under the Bankruptcy Clause. But what if nobody has an
incentive to raise this issue at any point in which the law is in operation? It
might happen, in which case the statute will do its work, and Congress will
have evidently extended its powers under the “oddball” clause a bit further.126
Odds are, somebody will raise the issue. As this Article goes to print, the
Title III case is just getting underway and is already off to a contentious
start. 127 And nobody thinks that bondholder harmony is going to break out
anytime soon.
124. See Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Bondholders in for Bumpy Bankruptcy Ride, REUTERS (May
4, 2017, 11:48 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt-bankruptcy-analysisidUSKBN18022T.
125. See Brian Chappatta, With Eye on Puerto Rico, Guam Says No to Territorial Bankruptcy,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-09/with-eye-onpuerto-rico-guam-says-no-to-territorial-bankruptcy.
126. See Lubben, Bankruptcy Clause, supra note 2.
127. For example, the motion for joint administration, normally a routine administrative matter
in chapter 11 cases, has been the subject of several objections, including at least one which demands
the right to take discovery on the issue. Objection of the Puerto Rico Funds to Debtors’ Motion for
Entry of an Order Directing Joint Administration of Title III Cases, In re Financial Oversight &
Mgmt. Board for P.R., (2017) (No. 17-03283-LTS).
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Perhaps more realistically, we need to consider the probability that
matters will simply blow past this issue, even if raised. After all the work to
get PROMESA passed, and the bipartisan belief that there is no other
solution, it may be hard for any group to gain traction with an argument that
dismantles the process. At the very least, it seems unlikely that the Title III
process will come to a halt while anyone pursues the uniformity argument. It
would not be surprising to see the appellate courts take their time with any
such appeal and then proclaim that the matter had suddenly become moot.
***
As this Article was in editing, the Caribbean was battered by multiple
hurricanes. The first devastated the U. S. Virgin Islands, while the second left
all of Puerto Rico without any electrical service for weeks. The latter served
to remind all of the extreme challenges the Commonwealth faces in getting
its economy in order, at the same time it remains in a legal netherworld. 128
And the devastation on the Virgin Islands has led some to suggest that it too
will need to restructure its debts. One obvious solution would be to extend
PROMESA to other territories. If Congress did so, the uniformity issue might
vanish. Likewise, the devastation in Puerto Rico itself might convince the
bondholders that any problems with PROMESA are no longer worth
litigating, as the Commonwealth will struggle to even get its economy back
to the point it was before the hurricanes. Only time will tell.

128. See generally Hiram Meléndez Juarbe, In the Red: Puerto Rico’s Fiscal and Democratic
Deficits Laid Bare, XXXVII QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 645 (2017) (It.), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3022151.

